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Abstract
Among both academics and the wider development community there seems to be a gen-
eral acceptance of the value of good governance and its role in promoting economic growth.
However, beyond this general statement, there is a lack of deeper theoretical understanding
as to why good governance is expected to foster economic growth and how such e⁄ects may
take place. We de￿ne governance quality as the capacity of a government to internalize
externality. A theoretical model is developed to formally integrate governance quality into
an endogenous growth framework. We elucidate the underlying mechanisms, through which
governance quality a⁄ects economic performance: governance quality a⁄ects the produc-
tivity of public investment and in turn has an impact on economic performance. We also
highlight that the endogeneity of governance quality and development stages have strong
implications for the governance-growth relationship.
Keyword: governance quality, economic growth, endogenous growth model, political
institutions
JEL classi￿cation codes: O41; O43; P16
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University, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia. Email address: tao.kong@anu.edu.au1
1 Introduction
While political scientists have a long history of studying the various e⁄ects of political power
arrangements and the role of government, economists have dedicated increasing attention to
the impacts of political institutions and issues of governance quality in the process of social-
economic development (for example, North 1990, 1999; Olson, 1996, 2000; Acemoglu et al.
2001, 2004, Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Rodrik et al., 2002, Kaufmann et al. 2007, Seldadyo
et al. 2007). The burgeoning literature on the topic has indicated a broad consensus in that
economic performance is not always warranted by economic characteristics alone, but it is often
shaped by the political and institutional environment in which economic activities take place.
It is through the political process in which con￿ icting interests ultimately are aggregated into
public policy decisions. It is then through governance in terms of both making and implemen-
tation of public policies that incentives are shaped for economic actors in a society. Therefore,
the quality of governance has a fundamental impact on the ultimate economic performance.
Summers (2004) summarized that an overwhelming lesson of the 1990s is the transcendent im-
portance of the quality of institutions and the closely related questions of the e¢ cacy of political
administration.1
However, the seemingly well-understood notion of governance is exceedingly ambiguous and
inconsistent, and the empirical relationship between governance and economic growth is facing
dispute and challenge (Kurtz and Schrank 2007, Andrews 2008, Langbein and Knack 2008).
Moreover, beyond the general statement of the critical role of governance quality, many im-
portant questions remain unanswered. In the existing literature, little has been said as to
why governance quality matters and how governance quality a⁄ects economic development.
Notwithstanding a growing body of empirical literature (for example, Knack 2003, Kaufmann
et al. 2007), the concept of governance quality is yet to be fully incorporated into any coherent
modeling frameworks. To address the lack of theoretical understanding of the governance-growth
1While we focus on the partial impact of governance on economic growth, we acknowledge the existence of
the feedback e⁄ect from economic performance to governance quality. In this paper, we see governance quality as
an outcome of a given political institutional structure. Any investigation dealing with the feedback e⁄ect would
necessarily involve an investigation of the co-evolution of political institutions, economic growth and governance
quality, which is beyond the scope of this paper.2
nexus, this paper focuses on modeling the growth e⁄ects of governance quality. We formally
incorporate governance quality into an endogenous economic growth model, and demonstrate a
potential avenue through which governance quality can a⁄ect economic growth.
In Section 2, we start with a brief discussion on the concept of governance and de￿ne
governance quality in this study. We proceed by o⁄ering an overview of the related literature
and highlight how our theoretical investigation is related to the existing theoretical and empirical
studies. Section 3 describes how we integrate governance quality into an endogenous economic
growth model. We propose a theoretical model in which governance quality is predominantly
realized through government tax extraction and resources allocation for public goods and service
provision. The productivity of a government utilizing tax revenue for productive purposes thus
re￿ ects the notion of governance quality. Within an endogenous economic growth framework, we
incorporate ideas on government spending and externality to explore the e⁄ects of governance
quality. We use governance quality as part of an external factor to characterize the process of
public capital accumulation. We trace the dynamics of the economy and demonstrate that in
steady state, governance quality has a positive impact on long-run economic growth.
In Section 4, we explore the important role of development stages in understanding the
governance-growth link by incorporating the political science literature on the underlying in-
stitutional determinants of governance quality. Findings from this extension can shed light on
the empirical puzzles related to the governance-growth nexus as well as the relationship be-
tween political regime and economic growth. We demonstrate that higher average income levels
allow for (but do not guarantee) better governance quality, and the optimal arrangement of
power in terms of maximizing governance quality varies across di⁄erent stages of development.
Therefore, while higher governance quality leads to better economic performance, the notion of
what constitutes good governance and the arrangement of underlying political power to achieve
it change in accordance with the evolution of the developmental context. Section 5 provides
conclusion remarks and discussion on avenues for future research.3
2 Related literature
Governance quality is a complex notion. It can take many forms and there may be trade-o⁄s
between di⁄erent dimensions of governance.2 Good governance is often loosely described as
e⁄ective government, which is a broad and multi-dimensional concept itself. Various widely
used governance indicators, e.g. governance index (Kaufmann et al. 1999, 2002, Kaufmann
et al. 2003), do not provide an all-encompassing de￿nition. Thomas (2007) describes the
various indicators as a result of the mixed ￿personal ideas of governance￿put forward by people
developing them. Quibria (2006) points out that governance is often ￿used as an umbrella
concept to federate a whole assortment of di⁄erent, albeit related, ideas￿ .
As a core concept in this study, we de￿ne governance quality as the capacity of a government
to internalize externalities. This de￿nition departs from the those based on description of
economic management or particular policy outcomes. We focus on the issues of externalities.
Speci￿cally, two types of externalities are fundamental to the role of government. One type
is the externalities that primarily originate from private sector and drive a wedge between the
individual￿ s costs and bene￿ts and that of the society. This type of externalities are commonly
categorised as market failure. For example, individuals (￿rms) under-invest in human capital
accumulation (R&D), as they do not fully recognize the positive social e⁄ects in the process of
self- optimization. In this case, good governance quality in terms of internalizing externality is
to provide public investment to align the interests of self-seeking individuals/￿rms with that of
the society as a whole. The second type of externalities are the ones stemmed from government
behaviour, and hence government failure. In such cases, government can be a major source of
negative externality exhibiting its predatory behaviour by enriching itself at great expense to the
economy. High governance quality therefore means the control of a government￿ s discretionary
and arbitrary behaviour. Under this de￿nition, we e⁄ectively conceptualize governance quality
as a joint product of two important features, ￿rst, e⁄ectiveness in public goods and second,
services provision and control of predatory behaviour.
2See Quibria (2006) for a review of the concept of governance and how to measure its quality.4
Theoretical work that explicitly links governance quality and economic growth remains
sparse. Gradstein (2004) is one of the few studies that present formalized models. However,
to the best of our knowledge, the role of governance quality has not been explicitly dealt with
in an endogenous economic growth model. To capture the e⁄ect of governance quality, we in-
troduce an external factor into the public capital accumulation equation. This external factor
consists of governance quality and an average productivity indicator. To describe the degree
that government internalizes externalities, the external factor we formulate is akin to the ones
used in the models with knowledge spillover (for example, Romer 1986, Tamura 1991). We use
governance quality to represent the extent of internalized externalities of the private capital
productivity. At the same time, better quality of governance also indicates higher productivity
of government in transforming tax revenue into public investment.
Our theoretical framework is most closely related to economic growth models incorporating
government spending. In line with literature on government spending, we consider that gov-
ernment extracts tax and allocate tax revenue for public goods provision. Such allocation of
resources involves two forms of trade-o⁄s. One is the intertemporal trade-o⁄where consumption
and welfare decline in the short run, as resources are attracted toward government spending,
but improve over time if productivity is enhanced. The other trade-o⁄is between private capital
accumulation and government spending, where taxation diverts resources away from the former
towards the latter. In general, government spending provides two types of public goods: public
investment and public service. The former primarily refers to spending on productive inputs,
which can be accumulated, such as construction of infrastructure, provision of mass education
and training. Development of some institutional factors, for example, legal systems, regulatory
policies, rules and the enforcement of property rights can also be considered as public invest-
ment. In contrast, public service mainly concerns spending on the provision of public services,
which are perishable.3
3The distinction between these two types of public goods is probably more conceptual than practical. The
di⁄erent dimensions of governance quality ￿nanced by two di⁄erent types of public expenditure are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive. For example, expenditure on strengthening the legal system and building other social
objectives has obviously two-fold e⁄ect. These e⁄ects are not only essential to production but also imperfect
substitutes to other productive resources.5
From a technical perspective, this public investment vs. public service classi￿cation cor-
responds to two di⁄erent roles of government spending in growth modeling. In the existing
literature, Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993) stand for two di⁄erent treatments of gov-
ernment spending in an economic growth context. Speci￿cally, Barro considers government
spending only in the form of public service that cannot be accumulated. Consequently, this
type of government spending is a ￿ ow variable and the model essentially reduced to a version
of the AK model. Key economic variables in Barro￿ s model are consequently all on the bal-
anced growth path, and hence there are no transitional dynamics. In contrast, Futagami et
al. develop an endogenous economic growth model with public capital as stock that can be
accumulated, and hence their model involves transitional dynamics. To focus on the govern-
ment spending that is most relevant to governance quality, our model explores how governance
quality a⁄ects long run economic growth through the evolution of public capital accumulation.
With the presence of two stock variables, private and public capital, our model has transitional
dynamics. In addition, discussions in Futagami et al. (1993) and Barro (1990) on the optimal
size of government are limited to the optimal tax rate. Our model extends to derive the impact
of governance quality on the growth-maximizing tax rate.
In its emphasis on the growth e⁄ect of governance quality, our study is closely connected
to the empirical investigations of governance and economic growth. Literature in this area
has proliferated over the past decade, producing a large number of cross-countries studies (for
example, Mosca, 2007) and country-speci￿c case studies.4 However, there remains a lack of
consensus on fundamental questions such as ￿what is the role of governance?￿and ￿what con-
stitutes an e⁄ective government?￿ Part of the reason behind the overall inclusiveness of the
literature is related to the identi￿cation di¢ culties involved in empirical analysis. Glaeser et al.
(2004), among others, have stressed the fragility and sensitivity of many empirical ￿ndings due
to unsuitable indicators of institutions used and the estimation technique employed.
More importantly, the mixed empirical ￿ndings re￿ ect the lack of an e⁄ective theoretical
4For example, see studies on US (Matheson et al. 2007), on UK, Denmark and other OECD countries (Rexed
et al. 2007) and Australia and New Zealand (Halligan, 2007).6
framework to guide the use of various institutional and governance quality indicators (Andrews,
2008). A methodological concern arises when a large number of institutional and governance
variables are assembled under the vague labels of institution and governance. Without dif-
ferentiating the vastly di⁄erent nature and implications of these variables, an indicator of the
con￿guration of political institutions (e.g. political regime) is analyzed typically the same way
as a variable that demonstrates the capacity of a government to produce and implement good
policies (e.g. quality of regulatory policies and government e⁄ectiveness). Consequently, when
probing the impact of governance quality, endogenous variables are often treated as given and
the economics literature remains largely agnostic on its underlying determinants. Andrews
(2008) reviews existing studies using various governance indicators, and concludes that the pic-
ture emerged from the ￿good governance agenda￿is of limited use for developing countries and
could be misleading in shedding light on improving governance quality. Andrews identi￿es the
major problems with various governance indicators is the lack of an e⁄ective underlying the-
oretical framework, which allows for an investigation into the roles of government in di⁄erent
developmental contexts. Clearly, a major gap exists between the proliferating yet controversial
statistical evidence of the importance of governance on the one hand, and the lack of theoretical
analysis of its role on the other.
3 An endogenous economic growth model with governance qual-
ity
In the spirit of Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993), the model described here considers
public capital as a productive input factor, which directly enters the production function. Fur-
thermore, it is assumed that the government imposes taxes and uses revenues to ￿nance public
expenditure that directly a⁄ects the decisions of private agents in the economy. This setting
leads to an optimization process of government ￿scal policy. Governance quality is thus formally
introduced into the context of economic growth.
￿ Production technology7
Consider an economy consisting of a continuum of representative individuals or household
agents, where each representative agent has an in￿nite planning horizon and possesses perfect
insight. Each agent is endowed with a unit of labor Lt, and produces output Yt at time t, using




t 0 < ￿ < 1;A > 0 (1)
where A is a total factor productivity (TFP) parameter, Kt denotes the agent￿ s stock of
private capital. Gt denotes government investment as stock of government capital, such as
transportation network, other infrastructure and additional institutional factors that a⁄ect pri-
vate productivity. Moreover, Gt is assumed to be non-rival and available to producers at the
same time. As a result, the production function exhibits constant returns to scale in two pri-
vate factors￿ labour Lt and capital Kt, and increasing returns to scale when public capital Gt
is included. The restrictions on parameters ￿ and A ensure output has positive, but diminish-





Eq(2) is similar to the production technology in Futagami et al. (1993), in which public
capital is also considered as a stock variable. The accumulation of private capital is governed
by
￿
kt = (1 ￿ ￿)yt ￿ ct ￿ ￿Kkt (3)
which indicates that the rate of private capital accumulation in the economy is the excess of
current production over private consumption and taxes that contribute to public expenditures
less depreciation. We assume that the government sets its tax revenue as a ￿xed fraction ￿ of
output. Technically, this functional form allows ￿ to be set arbitrarily. In a normative case, ￿
can be chosen optimally to maximise certain objectives, such as growth rates and social welfare,8
taking into account an assumption about the degree of government benevolence.
In contrast to private capital accumulation, public capital accumulation,
￿
Gt, is a joint prod-
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Kt, which is the average output-capital ratio, and f(
~
yt) represents the external
e⁄ects of private economic activities on the society as a whole, such as social bene￿ts or costs
due to change in private economic actions. ￿ denotes governance quality, re￿ ecting the capacity
of government regulations and policies including tax policies to ￿correct￿ externalities so as
to maximise the interests of the society. Correspondingly, in this model, the degree to which
externalities are internalised, or in other words, the behaviour of f(
~
yt), largely depends on ￿.
Intuitively, Eq(4b) also indicates that given the same average output-capital ratio, the higher the
governance quality the greater such externality is internalised into public capital accumulation.
Therefore, f(
~
yt) = ( Yt
Kt)￿ captures the internalised externality on the society.
Technically, f(
~
yt) can also be interpreted as a productivity factor for transforming gov-
ernment tax revenue into public capital. Instead of including externalities as a component of
production function, such as the ￿learning-by-doing￿type of models of Arrow (1962) and Romer
(1986), this model incorporates the impact of externalities in the function which governs the
evolution of public capital. This is not only consistent with the idea that externalities have an
important impact on the aggregate goods production, but also highlights the implications of
governance quality for public capital and in turn the aggregate economy. ￿K and ￿G in Eq(3)
and Eq(4a) are depreciation rates of private capital and public capital, respectively. For sim-
plicity, they are both assumed to be zero. Substitute Eq(4b) into Eq(4a), the accumulation of9
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￿ Preference






e￿￿t for ￿ < 1,and ￿ 6= 0 (5)
￿ lnct for ￿ = 0
where ct denotes the consumption of an individual agent at time t and ￿ is the rate of time
preference. Following Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993), ￿ can be interpreted as the di⁄erence
between the pure rate of time preference (￿￿) and the exogenous rate of population growth (n),
i.e.￿ = ￿￿￿n. The exponent relates to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which equals
the inverse of (1 ￿ ￿).
￿ Solving the model
Formally, an agent￿ s objective is to choose a consumption level so as to maximise the above
utility function Eq(5), subject to the capital accumulation, Eq(3). The derivation in Appendix









(1￿￿)￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ (6)
For simplicity, let Lt, the total amount of labour employed in the production be normalised
to 1. With this assumption, Lt = 1 for all t, all quantities in aggregate terms have the same




+ ￿t [(1 ￿ ￿)yt ￿ ct] (7)10












Eq(8) shows that the marginal contribution of consumption to the current ￿ ow of value equals
the product of the value of stock at time t and the marginal e⁄ect of consumption on the rate of
growth of capital at that time. Eq(9) represents that the rate of change in the value of wealth
equals the marginal impact of level of capital on its own rate of growth with respect to time
preference. These ￿rst order conditions together with the following transversality condition
lim
t!1
￿tkte￿￿t = 0 (10)














Substitute Yt = AK￿
t G1￿￿









Assume there exists an equilibrium where consumption (ct ), private capital (kt ), public capital
(Gt) and national product (yt) are growing at the same pace, g, i.e. on the balanced growth




























(1￿￿)￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ (15)
Since the derivation of the equilibrium is based on the assumption of its existence, the next
task is to prove such existence.
- Proposition 1 There exists a unique balanced growth path, where ct, kt, Gt and Yt have
the same growth rate of g.5
- Proposition 2 For any given initial value of Z = G
K, there exist a unique stable path
leading to the balanced growth path.6
- Proposition 3 Governance quality has a positive impact on the long run growth rate.
To see the impact of governance quality on the long-run economic growth rate, we apply




















This means the sign of
dg




A￿) is greater (less than) 0,
dg
d￿
is less (greater) than 0. To see the sign of ln(
g


















5Proof of Proposition 1 is included in Appendix.
6Derivations to prove Proposition 2 is included in Appendix.12
Take logarithm of both sides
1 ￿ ￿









1￿￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which is typically < 1 implying
￿ < 0, and hence
1￿￿
￿(1￿￿) > 1. Therefore, the LHS of Eq(17b) is greater than zero and the sign
of ln(
g
A￿) depends on that of 1￿￿
(1￿￿)￿￿￿. ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿) are the shares of private capital and
public capital on the equilibrium growth path as well as the elasticities of private and public
capital with respect to the national product. Therefore, ￿
1￿￿ is the elasticity of substitution of
public capital with respect to private capital. Recall that ￿ is governance quality indicating the
capacity of a government to internalise externalities. This implies that when the externalities are
entirely internalised, the theoretically best achievable governance quality in this model equals
to ￿
1￿￿, and hence ￿ < ￿
1￿￿. Consequently, 1￿￿
(1￿￿)￿￿￿ < 0, and therefore ln
g
A￿ < 0. As a result,
dg
d￿ > 0, indicating that the higher the quality of governance, the higher the long-run economic
growth rate.
￿ Impact of governance quality on the size of government
In addition, our model allows us to explore the e⁄ects of governance quality on optimal tax
rate (or sometimes referred to as optimal size of government). There has been extensive litera-
ture on the optimal government size, which is often approximated by the value of government
spending ￿nanced by tax revenue. The question of the optimal size of government thus often
becomes a question of optimal tax rate. Our model provides a linkage, which connects the idea
of governance quality and the optimal size of a government. We ￿rst establish the existence of
an optimal tax rate.
- Proposition 4 There exists a unique optimal tax rate ￿￿ which maximises the long-run
growth rate, and governance quality has a positive impact on the optimal tax rate.13



























The sign of Eq(18) hinges on whether ￿ is greater or less than ￿
1￿￿. Because ￿ < ￿
1￿￿, the
denominator is unambiguously positive and leads to the following results:
If ￿ > ￿￿ dg
d￿ < 0
If ￿ = ￿￿ dg
d￿ = 0




1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(19)
It is clear from these results that there exists an optimal tax rate ￿￿ which maximises the
balanced growth rate. Also because ￿ < ￿
1￿￿, it follows that ￿￿ is within the feasible range
between 0 and 1.
￿￿ =
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(20)
From Eq(20), it is straightforward to see that ￿ and ￿￿ are positively correlated. Intuitively,
it indicates the better the quality of governance the higher the optimal tax rate of a government
in terms of maximising the long-run growth rates.
3.1 Impact of development stages on the optimal political institutional struc-
ture
Reviewing the recent trends in economics literature, Deaton (2010) identi￿es the major limita-
tions of empirical studies that show how certain developmental projects can lead to a particular
set of observable results without, however, explaining how and why such projects can work.
Deaton therefore calls a much-needed refocus toward the investigation of potentially generaliz-
able mechanisms and in what context. The endogenous growth model presented in the previous
section elucidates the mechanism through with the governance-growth link operates. In this
section, we address the important issue of the developmental context in which the growth e⁄ects14
of governance quality take place. A particular level of development is associated with a host of
social-economic characteristics that are of great importance for growth, for example, provision
of infrastructure, the average level of mass education as well as the enforcement of the rule of
law. These factors, together with historical, cultural and additional institutional factors de￿ne
a society￿ s prevailing conditions. A government will need to build upon these conditions, allow
a suitable time frame for these conditions to evolve and deal with issues that arise from these
conditions. In this study, we use development stages as a (imperfect) proxy to characterize the
context in which the link between governance and growth exists.
We ￿rst provide the political institutional background to the endogenous economic model by
drawing on the established political science literature on the underlying political institutional
factors that shape governance quality. Consistent with Acemoglu et al. (2004) and many others,
political institutions are considered to de￿ne the constraints and the incentives of the key actors
in the political sphere.7 Political institutional structure, referring to the distribution of political
power, determines the capacity and opportunity of the government to exercise discretion over
the rules that organize social life, and consequently determines the quality of governance.8
Furthermore, how political decision-making powers are structured has a signi￿cant impact on the
way it is exercised by the government. Di⁄erent types of organizational architecture may entail
respective incentive problems inherent to it and thus unique governance problems (Aoki, 2001).
The vast political science literature has generally suggested two, albeit somewhat contradictory,
understandings in terms of how political institutional con￿gurations a⁄ects governance quality.9
7The literature on political institutins and governance is vast. Without intention to provide a comprehensive
review, we primarily draw on the discussion in, among other, La⁄ont and Tirole (1991), Kydland and Prescott,
(1997), Persson et al. (1997, 2003), Mulligan et al. (2004).
8To overcome the de￿ciency of a democracy vs. authoritarian categorization, we make a deliberate departure
from this dichotomy and focus on the overall organizational structure of political powers. We replace a binary
approach of political regimes with a broader and continuous spectrum of the con￿gurations of aggregate decision-
making powers, and thereby accommodate a wide variety of political institutional arrangements.
9In the established political economy literature, power fragmentation typically involves various forms of classi-
￿cation: centralization vs. decentralization; functional division of power vs. sequential division of power, etc (e.g.
Brennan and Hamlin, 1994). Moreover, in many previous studies, the term "separation of power" often refers
to Locke and Montesquieu￿ s concept of the need for the division of legislative, executive, and judicial branches
of government in democracies. We primarily focus on the horizontal separation of power at the aggregate level
rather than vertical decentralization that disperses state responsibilities to regional branch o¢ ces (see for exam-
ple, Oates 1972, Gordon, 1983, Sinn 1990). Consistent with our de￿nition of political institutional con￿guration,
we adopt a more generalized approach, which does not apply restrictively to modern western style democracies.
We thus accommodate a wide variety of political institutional arrangements by replacing a binary approach of15
One line of political science theory emphasizes the risk of capricious and arbitrary behav-
iour from excessively concentrated power, and hence advocates for more dispersed structures of
political institutions in the interests of credibility and stability. Elster (1994:215) categorically
asserts that in order to be e⁄ective, power must be divided. In contrast, this view is chal-
lenged by arguments that highlight the indecisiveness, higher probability of inertia and delays
in response associated with fragmented power-sharing structures. This school of thought of-
ten draws upon the experiences of fast growing East Asian economies with distinctively strong
state. Studies, such as Alesina and Drazen (1991), Alesina et al. (1998), Woo-Cummings (1999),
and Keefer (2004), stress the desirability of more concentrated political institutional structures
and the virtue of decisiveness and autonomy in the process of government policy-making and
implementation.10
These two schools of thought in political science highlight the trade-o⁄ and complemen-
tarity between e⁄ectiveness and credibility as two essential features of governance quality. In
the same vein, Olson (2000) identi￿es the type of governments needed for growth: on the one
hand, secure and well de￿ned of private property and impartial enforcement of contracts and,
on the other hand, the absence of predation. This conceptualization of governance quality is
in line with the de￿nition used in our study. Good governance quality means a joint product
of being capable of correcting market failure and limiting government failure at the same time,
i.e. to internalize externalities created by both the private and public sectors. Furthermore,
to built upon the literature on the association between governance quality and its underlying
power-sharing structure, we consider governance quality as a product of political institutional
structure. MacIntyre (2003) reconciles these two con￿ icting paradigms by suggesting a non-
monotonic relationship between the power concentration structure and the resulted impact on
governance quality.11 Namely, neither overly fragmented nor excessively concentrated power-
sharing structure will lead to good governance.12 This conclusion motivates us to extend our in-
political regimes with a broader and continuous spectrum of the con￿gurations of aggregate decision-making
powers.
10Related studies also include, for example, Wade (1990), Weingnast (1995), McCubbins (1989).
11MacIntyre (2003) uses ￿non-linear￿to characterize this trade-o⁄ e⁄ect of political institutional structure on
governance quality. To be more precise, we term it a ￿non-monotonic￿relationship.
12To understand the e⁄ects of the con￿guration of political institutions on governance quality, we can consider16
vestigation on the governance-growth link and incorporate the underlying political institutional
structures. We can postulate that the relationship between political institutional structure and
economic growth outcome is likely to be non-monotonic. Governance quality can now serve as
a channel, through which political institutional structures a⁄ect economic growth. Governance
quality and long-run economic growth can be better achieved when the political power is shared
in a balanced structure and not overly concentrated or excessively fragmented.13
How do levels of development a⁄ect this relationship? A higher level of development is
typically associated with not only more material wealth and higher productivity, but also a
more educated population, better infrastructure and more e⁄ective means for monitoring and
revealing rent-seeking behaviour, such as media and press. Therefore, as countries move up on
the development ladder, whilst holding political institutional structure constant, they are likely
to be more e⁄ective in controlling discretionary behaviour, and are more capable of providing
public goods and services. Consequently, ceteris paribus, the level of development positively
a⁄ects the resulting governance quality. With the aid of a more educated population, the
additional cost of rigidity (due to the fragmentation of power arrangements) is diminishing at
the same time as an economy is improving its developmental stage. Therefore, the governance-
maximizing political institutional con￿guration becomes more dispersed as a country becomes
more developed. The extension of the original model thus accommodates the idea that an
optimal structure of political institutions depends at least partially on the speci￿c stage of
development.14
the costs associated with the two aspects of governance quality, i.e. providing public goods and engaging in rent
extraction. Speci￿cally, we can characterize the unit cost of public goods or services provision as the sum of the
unit cost of private consumption goods production as a benchmark in addition to an ine¢ ciency factor. The
ine¢ ciency factor captures the negative e⁄ect resulted from fragmentation of political power. Fragmentation of
power increases the cost for and reduces productivity of a government to convert tax revenue into public goods and
services provision. At the same time, we can capture the cost of rent-seeking behavior as an increasing function of
power fragmentation. As political institutional structure becomes more dispersed, self-enriching behaviour tends
to be more di¢ cult due to increase in checks and balances.
13Rivera-Batiz (2002) is one of the few attempts in the economics literature that integrate institutions, partic-
ularly political institutions into the formal economic growth model. Rivera-Batiz￿ s work provides a theoretical
underpinning for empirical result that demonstrates democratic countries have signi￿cantly higher quality of
governance. These results emphasize the point that contribution to growth only occurs insofar as democracy
improves governance quality.
14The assertion that the optimal con￿guration of political power is less dispersed for poorer countries than
for rich countries, however, does not lead to the assertion that checks and balances are not important or less
desirable in poor countries. On the contrary, maintaining credibility tends to be economically important in17
4 Conclusion
The conventional neoclassical wisdom is that economic growth is largely determined by the
accumulation of physical capital, human capital, and knowledge usable in production. These
factors are considered as proximate determinants of economic growth, which characterize the
immediate connection between the productive factors and economic outcome. For many, today,
economics is understood as an interplay of incentives, largely because the changes in productive
factors are primarily driven by decisions of economic agents. These decisions are in turn shaped
by incentives: incentives to work hard, to produce good quality products, to study, to invest,
to save, etc. (La⁄ont and Martimort 2002). Therefore, incentives are deeper determinants
underlying the immediate productive factors. It is the changes in incentives that in turn a⁄ect
human behaviour. One important aspect to understand the underlying incentives of an economy
is its governance quality. The governance-growth link has been explored empirically for over a
decade. However, in the absence of a coherent theoretical model, the impact of governance on
growth remains a matter of controversy.
Pawson and Tilley (1997) articulate that it is the combination of mechanism and context
that generates outcomes and that, without understanding this combination, scienti￿c progress
is unlikely (cited in Deaton 2010). In this paper, we de￿ne the concept of governance quality
as the capacity of government to internalize externalities originated from both private and
public sectors. We integrate governance quality into an endogenous economic growth model
and demonstrate that governance quality a⁄ects economic growth through the channel of the
public capital accumulation. The higher the quality of governance is, the more productive a
government will be in transforming tax revenue into public goods and services. We also show
that the optimal size of government, as measured by tax rate, is a function of governance quality:
the better quality a government, the greater the optimal tax rate.
developing countries (World Bank, 2002). What the preceding conclusions highlight is that the trade-o⁄ between
e⁄ectiveness in public goods provision and control of rent-seeking behaviour may have di⁄erent implications for
countries at di⁄erent stages of development. More generally, this provides a theoretical explanation for the notion
that there is no one-size-￿ts-all organizational template, which can be indiscriminately applied across board to
warrant best governance quality.18
Against the backdrop of complex intertwining of politics and economics, we draw on the
existing political science literature to capture the relationship between the characteristics of au-
thority and the general patterns of governance. The non-trivial choice of political institutional
structure embodies the trade-o⁄ facing a government between addressing market failure and
controlling government failure. Concentrated power tends to entail arbitrary and discretionary
behavior, and translates into higher likelihood of rent extracted by the government, while frag-
mented power-sharing structures often encourage budget de￿cits, delay in policy responses and
higher cost of public goods and service provision. By integrating the non-monotonic relation-
ship between political institutional structure and governance quality into the governance-growth
nexus, we suggest that governance quality can serve as a channel through which political in-
stitutions a⁄ect economic performance. Our results on the varying optimal con￿guration of
political powers can also shed light on the ongoing debate concerning the economic growth
e⁄ects of political institutions. Without looking through the lens of developmental context,
the views in the existing literature are diverging and the overall evidences are inconclusive as
to whether a particular regime type improves or hinders long-run economic performance. In
contrast, we underscore that economic performance depends on the compatibility of a country￿ s
political institutions and its idiosyncratic characteristics and prevailing conditions. The degree
to which political institutional structures have reached their optimum depends on the context
of economies at particular stages of development.
By extending the governance-growth into the political institutional context, we can better
understand the role of governance quality in the process of economic growth. Examining the
e⁄ects of developmental levels allows us to uncover an important issue that potentially explained
the mixed empirical results on governance-growth link as well as the more controversial rela-
tionship between political regime and growth.15 Our analysis suggests that ceteris paribus, the
political institutional structure that maximizes governance quality (and hence growth) varies
15There is a vast body of literature on the relationship between political regims and economic performance. A
comprehensive review of the relevant literature is beyond the scope of the present study. For theories and political
economy models, see for example Buchanan (1975), Persson and Tabellini (2000). For empirical investigations, see
for Prezeworki and Limongi￿ s (1993) earlier review of 18 studies and Benaubou (1996), Brunetti (1997) reporting
diverging and ambiguous results of emprical investigation. More recent studies include Henisz (2000a, 2000b),
Cox and McCubbins (2001) and Feng (2003).19
across developmental contexts. This ￿nding can help resolve some empirical puzzles, such as
the role of government in East Asia. Stiglitz (2002) observes ￿In East Asia, the part of the
world that has had the most successful development, governments took an unabashedly central
role...the success of East Asia provided dramatic evidence of the superiority of an economy
in which government takes an active role to the self-regulating market.￿Our analysis implies
that economies at lower development levels, ceteris paribus, can maximize governance quality
(and hence growth) with a con￿guration of political institutions that is relatively concentrated
so long as it is compatible with the economy￿ s developmental context. Furthermore, the notion
that optimal political institutional structures need to be attuned with levels of development
gives rise to implications on sustainability of economic growth and the advocacy of a particular
"institutional blend". A key determinant of the sustainability of growth will be as to whether
the political institutional structure can evolve in ways that will meet the demands of changing
economic conditions.
Inferences of the optimal endogenous optimal structure of political power can be applied
to a single country￿ s transitional experience, moving from a lower to a higher rung on the de-
velopment ladder, as well as within a cross-countries context. Whilst many underdeveloped
countries appear to have concentrated political institutional con￿gurations, the concept of cen-
tralized power seems to have lost much popularity within the development community. The
idea of division of power promises a wide range of bene￿ts. Consequently, fragmenting political
decision-making power and introducing checks and balances are often suggested as means to
improve government credibility and e⁄ectiveness and economic performance. Our study casts
doubts on such a claim. Institutions that have delivered growth in some countries do not neces-
sarily engender a favorable economic outcome under di⁄erent circumstances. Countries need to
consider their speci￿c development stages before emulating the political institutional con￿gu-
ration of other countries. By demonstrating the critical role of development stages, we provide
a theoretical explanation as to why there are no one-size-￿ts-all policies that are applicable to
all economies. Policies that are associated with favorable economic performance in one country
do not necessarily lead to similar outcome when applied in another country.20
A Proof for Proposition 1 and 2
￿ Proposition 1: There exists a unique balanced growth path, where ct, kt, Gt and Yt
have the same growth rate of g.
￿Proof 1: First, Eq(6) can be rewritten as























The sign of ￿0(g) depends on the value of (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿. If ￿00(g) > 0, ￿(g) is a convex function
with the following properties
￿0(g) < 0 if ￿ < ￿
1￿￿
￿0(g) > 0 if ￿ > ￿
1￿￿
(A3)













The LHS of Eq(A1) will intersect and only intersect with ￿(g) once, and that guarantees a
unique positive balanced growth rate in the equilibrium.
￿ ￿Proof 2: Alternatively, summarising Eq(4a), Eq(5) and Eq(10), the following dynamic


































￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Z1￿￿ + X (A5b)
where X ￿ c
k, and Z ￿ G
K.
These equations describe the dynamics of the economy. To characterise the steady-state of
the model and demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, the following




Z = 0. The
stationary state is de￿ned by
X￿ =







X￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)Z￿1￿￿
￿ A￿Z￿(1￿￿)￿￿￿ (A6b)
where variables with asterisks represent the steady-state value of the variables. On the
balanced growth path, private capital, public capital, consumption and national product
are all growing at the same rate, denoted by g.
Subtract Eq(A6b) from Eq(A6a),









In steady-state, ￿(Z￿) = 0. Di⁄erentiate ￿(Z￿) with respect to Z￿,
￿
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Eq(A8) is less than zero because the sign of the ￿rst item depends on the value of (1￿￿)￿￿
￿, and given the reasons mentioned above, i.e.￿ < ￿
1￿￿, and therefore (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿ < 0.22
The second order derivative of ￿(Z￿) with respect to Z￿ equals to
￿
00
(Z￿) = [(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿][(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1]A￿Z(1￿￿)￿￿￿￿2 +






Therefore, ￿(Z￿) is a convex function that monotonically decreases. When Z￿ is small
enough, ￿(Z￿) > 0 and ￿(Z￿) < 0,when Z￿ is su¢ ciently large. As a result, there is a
unique positive value of Z￿ which satis￿es ￿(Z￿) = 0. It implies that if X￿ is positive,










and it indicates that in order to have X￿ > 0, (
￿
C




C)￿ is only a fraction of (1 ￿ ￿)( G
K)￿1￿￿
, it once again proves there exists
a unique balanced growth path.
Given the existence of the equilibrium, the next task is to examine the stability of the
equilibrium of balanced growth, and this requires investigation of the transitional dynam-
ics.
￿ Proposition 2: For any given initial value of Z = G
K, there exist a unique stable path
leading to the balanced growth path.
￿Proof:First, rewrite Eq(A5a) and Eq(A5b)
￿
X = [











￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Z1￿￿ + X]Z (A10b)
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(1￿￿)￿￿￿￿1





The determinant of this coe¢ cient matrix J equals to
detJ = XZ1￿￿
￿





(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(A12)
Because the determinant of coe¢ cient matrix J is less than zero, it means that one of the
eigenvalues of this coe¢ cient matrix is positive and the other is negative. Therefore, the
balanced growth path or equilibrium at the steady-state is a saddle point, which essentially
means for any given initial value of Z = G
K, there exists a unique stable path converging to
the balanced growth equilibrium. This result is consistent with Proposition 2 in Futagami
et al. (1993) where they found the steady-growth equilibrium is stable.24
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